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In common law systems complex and in some cases unduly harsh 
relating to homicide have evolved. Issues concerned with the 
Mens rea o f homicide still remain unresolved, and the develop­
ment o f  constructive murder and manslaughter continues to raise 
troublesome legal and ethical issues. An argument is here advanced 
fo r  a radical simplification o f the law which would confine criminal 
liability fo r  causing death to cases where the accused intends or 
foresees death. An additional argument is made fo r  the abolition 
o f the fixed penalty fo r  murder in order to effect a further simplifi­
cation by making it unnecessary to provide fo r  partial defences 
such as provocation and diminished responsibility.
Les systèmes de common law ont élaboré des règles complexes et 
parfois excessivement sévères en matière d'homicide. De nombreuses 
controverses entourent encore le mens rea de l'homicide et le 
développement du constructive murder et de l’homicide involontaire 
coupable continue de soulever de difficiles questions d'ordre juridi­
que et moral. L'auteur propose une simplification radicale du droit 
qui ne retiendrait la responsabilité pénale de l'accusé que dans les 
cas où ce dernier avait l’intention de causer la mort ou prévoyait 
que la mort s'ensuivrait. L'auteur préconise en outre l'abolition 
de la peine fixe en cas de meurtre, ce qui rendrait inutiles les moyens 
de défense partiels tels que l'excuse de provocation et l'atténuation 
de responsabilité.
* Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture, delivered on March 7, 1979 at the University o f New Brunswick 
Law School, Fredericton, New Brunswick.
**L L.B ., 1956 (University o f Manchester), Barrister-at-Law, 1959 (Gray’s Inn). Professor o f Common 
Law, University o f Leeds.
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INTRODUCTION
In homicide, as in all other crimes, the definition consists o f two parts, the 
outward act and the state o f mind which accompanies it; and there is no 
crime (unless it be treason or libel) in which so many different possible states 
o f mind have to be considered. The case, moreover, is liable to one special 
qualification which is peculiar to this particular offence. Whatever else the 
definition includes it must include the fact o f death; but there is no definite 
connection at all between the fact o f death and the moral guilt or public 
danger o f the act by which death is caused. The most deliberate, desperate 
and cruel attempt on life may not cause death, the most trifling assault may 
cause it. Death may be intentionally caused under circumstances o f the
?;reatest possible atrocity, or under circumstances which produce rather pity or the offender than borror at the offence; or, again under circumstances 
which indicate determined defiance o f the law, but do not involve any special 
ill will to any particular person. This extreme variety in the circumstances 
under which, and the intentions with which death may be occasioned is the 
true cause o f the great difficulty which has been found in giving satisfactory 
definitions o f the different forms o f homicide. —  Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen, 3 H.C.L. 17.
“The facts,” said Lord Hailsham in Hyam v. D.P.P.,1
are simple, and not in dispute. In the early hours o f Saturday, July 15, 1972, 
the appellant [Mrs. Hyam] set fire to a dwelling house in Coventry by 
deliberately pouring about half a gallon o f petrol through the letter box and 
igniting it by means of a newspaper and a match. The house contained four 
persons, presumably asleep. They were a Mrs. Booth and her three children, 
a boy and the two young girls who were the subjects o f the charges. Mrs.
Booth and the boy escaped alive through a window. The two girls died as a 
result o f asphyxia by the fumes generated by the fire. The appellant’s 
motive . . .  was jealousy o f Mrs. Booth whom the appellant believed was likely 
to marry a Mr. Jones o f whom the appellant herself was the discarded, or 
partly discarded, mistress. Her account o f her actions, and her defence, was 
that she had started the fire only with the intention o f frightening Mrs. Booth 
into leaving the neighbourhood, and that she did not intend to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm.
If the facts were simple enough, then the law evidently was not, since 
the case exercised the Criminal Division o f the Court of Appeal and 
divided the House of Lords by three votes to two in favour of 
upholding Mrs. Hyam’s conviction for murder. The particular question 
for the appellate courts was whether the trial judge (Ackner J .)  was right 
in directing the jury that Mrs. Hyam could be convicted of murder if, in 
setting fire to the house, “she knew that it was highly probable that she 
would cause (death or) serious bodily harm to [Mrs. Booth]”. The more 
general issue was to determine the mens rea (malice aforethought) of 
murder. More generally still, the case invites discussion of what the mens 
rea of murder ought to be.
Before Hyam it was (or was thought to be) established in England 
that the mens rea of murder included (i) an intent to kill, and (ii) an
'[1975] A C. 55. at 65 (H.L.).
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intent to cause grievous bodily harm;2 but it was not clear how far, if at 
all, the definition extended beyond these. The trial judge thought it 
prudent to explore the uncharted area of the definition, no doubt 
because he felt that it was open to the jury on the facts to conclude that 
Mrs. Hyam did not intend (in the narrow sense of desire) to kill or cause 
grievous bodily harm to Mrs. Booth. In this context, however, Hyam is 
used not to determine what the common law of England is now thought 
to be, but as a convenient vehicle for discussing what the mental element 
in murder ought to be, and how, if at all, manslaughter is to be marked 
off from murder. These more general issues have been discussed by the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee in England,3 by the Law Reform 
Committee in New Zealand,4 and are, as I understand, under discussion 
by the Law Reform Commission in Canada.
SOME PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Any movement for reform must spring from a dissatisfaction with 
the present state of things. As I see it, there are two principal causes for 
dissatisfaction with the existing provisions in ss. 202-223 of the Criminal 
Code. The first is that the provisions are unduly complex and are not 
readily understandable. I think it more than ordinarily important that 
the criminal law (the whole of it, not merely that which pertains to 
homicide) should be understandable at least in its broad details by the 
citizen of ordinary intelligence, and I believe that the achievement of 
that aim lies well within our competence. Secondly, as I hope to show, 
certain of the provisions relating to constructive homicide are unduly 
harsh and at this stage of our social development have no place in a 
humane system.
It will be taken for granted, I think, that the Code must contain 
some prescription of homicide. Arguably, homicide could be subsumed 
in a more generally structured offence against the person which does 
not distinguish between conduct causing death and conduct causing 
harm less than death. After all, whether death be caused in fact is often 
a matter of chance only,5 and there is much to be said for a law which 
emphasises the intent rather than the event. Though this view is 
theoretically attractive, I think that, as a practical matter, it is a 
non-starter. Stephen (in the passage quoted) saw that the definition must 
include the fact o f death even though there might be no connection
‘ Lords Diplock and Rilbrandon held that the grievous bodily harm doctrine did not survive the 
abolition o f constructive malice by the Homicide Act, 1957, and Lord Cross expressed no final view on 
that matter. The grievous bodily harm doctrine has. however, been reaffirmed by the Court o f Appeal 
\nF.llerton, [1978] Crim. L.R. 166.
3Working Paper on Offences against the Person, (1976) H.M.S.O.
*Report on Culpable Homicide, (1976).
5J .  C. Smith, "The Element o f Chance in Criminal Liability”, [1971] Crtm. L.R. 63.
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between that fact and the moral guilt o f the offender. Whether or not it 
is logical, killing people happens to be regarded as more serious than 
causing harm short o f death. Whoever read a whodunnit where the hero 
was investigating a causing of bodily harm with intent, or an 
administering of noxious things with intent to aggrieve or annoy? The 
issue thus resolves itself into defining homicide. What I have to say is 
mainly concerned with the mental element and only incidentally with the 
actus reus.
Usually a reformer of the criminal law can concentrate on the 
substantive law without, in the first place, paying too much attention to 
sentencing. A reformer of the law of homicide, however, must be acutely 
aware of the issue of capital punishment which, it may well be, excites 
much deeper passions than the reform of the substantive law. It is an 
issue which I will take up later.
One last general point by way of introduction concerns the form of 
any future legislation. I hope that any proposals which are made and 
implemented will strike the right balance between the need for clear 
legislative guidance on matters of principle and the desirability of 
leaving to the courts the detailed development of those principles to 
particular cases. I say this because there seems a discernible tendency in 
much modern legislation to provide an answer for every problem that 
human ingenuity can devise. This results not only in complicated 
legislation but forces the judge into the straight-jacket of literalism with 
all its attendant evils.
Quite what is the “right balance” is a matter of judgment. By way of 
illustration the concept o f intention, which will surely figure in any 
definition of homicide, might be taken. I wonder how far it is possible 
and desirable to provide a comprehensive statutory definition of 
intention. The Law Commission in England believes that it can be done 
and has proposed6 (for the criminal law generally) the following clause 
in its Draft Criminal Liability (Mental Element) Bill:
(1) T he standard test o f intention is —
Did the person whose conduct is in issue either intend to produce the result
or have no substantial doubt that his conduct would produce it?
I realise I am quoting this clause in isolation but I must confess that I do 
not find the definition (or the test) all that helpful. At the risk of being 
frivolous, it seems to me not unlike a botanist defining a banana as “a 
fruit which is a banana, or a fruit about which there is no substantial 
doubt that it is a banana”. I am not saying that I can do any better, and 
it may be that others can, but I do wonder about the feasibility, and 
therefore the desirability, of defining such concepts as intention. Is
*Report on the Menial Element in Cnme, (1978) Law Comm. No. 89. The Report follows the Law 
Commission's Working Paper No. 31.
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provision to be made also for transferred intention, for direct and 
oblique intention, for conditional intention, for specific and general 
intention? One solution to the problem may lie in the legislature 
providing notes of guidance by way of explanation of the statutory text 
which would be used by the judge as an aid in their interpretation. The 
advantage lies in their flexibility; the judge would not be strictly bound 
by them but they would indicate the broad direction in which the 
legislature’s thinking lies.
At all events I remain convinced that the best solution to law reform 
lies in a partnership between the legislature and the courts. The 
legislature lays down the broad principles and the judges, far from being 
mere journeymen, are given a creative function. The legislature lays 
down the letter: the judges fulfil its spirit.
THE STARTING POINT
Returning to the case of Mrs. Hyam it would be possible to take 
different views of her mental state. She (a) may have intended to kill 
Mrs. Booth; (b) may not have intended (desired) to kill but realised that 
death was highly probable; (c) may not have intended to kill but realised 
that death was probable; (d) may not have intended to kill but realised 
that death was possible; or (e) may have intended only to frighten. She 
herself admitted to an intention to frighten and indicated her willingness 
to plead guilty to manslaughter. The prosecution would have none of 
that but clearly the prosecution had to establish more than an intention 
to frighten if a verdict of murder was to be supported. The trial judge, 
you will recall, confined his direction to (a) plus (b) so that if the jury 
had found that Mrs. Hyam foresaw death as merely probable or possible 
she could not have been convicted of murder. Laymen in this audience 
may be a little surprised to learn that lawyers believe that jurymen can 
distinguish between high probability, probability and possibility. If  so, 
you have a sympathetic supporter in Lord Hailsham.7 In the end, 
though, the House of Lords appears to have concluded that the trial 
judge was overcautious in confining the definition to (a) and (b) and 
should have extended it to (c) as well.
So far as I am concerned I would go farther still and include (d) — 
foresight of possibility. I say this because I believe the mental element for 
murder should accord with well established principles (at least well 
established for serious crime) so that if X causes Z’s death either 
intentionally or recklessly, he ought to be guilty of Z’s murder. I use 
recklessness here to connote a risk o f death foreseen by X, not 
necessarily requiring that X should have foreseen death as probable, still 
less highly probable; and the risk must be one which, in all the 
circumstances o f the case, was unreasonable to take.
7[1975] A.C. 55, at 76. Hence Lord Hailsham preferred a test based on intention to create a serious risk 
o f death. But whether a risk is serious involves a qualitative judgment.
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In certain circumstances such a definition of the mental element 
may involve X in liability for murder though he would not be liable at 
present under the Code. It calls, therefore, for explanation and 
justification.
Suppose that X places a bomb in a store which is timed to explode 
at 10:30 a.m. At 10:15 a.m. he telephones the store to give a warning 
about the bomb. He hopes, and with average luck can safely anticipate, 
that the store will be promptly cleared so that no one will be killed or 
even harmed. He realises, though, that a number of things may go 
wrong. The bomb may explode before 10:30. There might be a delay 
when he tries to telephone. The warning might not be taken seriously. 
There might be delays in clearing the store. But, fortified by what he 
has read in the newspapers o f similar cases in Northern Ireland, he 
reckons that the risk o f injury or death is about one in ten. He hopes 
that no one will be killed but decides that this risk is acceptable. 
Essentially he does not care. Something does go wrong and a shopper is 
killed when the bomb explodes.
If these facts were to occur in Canada it appears to be the case that 
X cannot be convicted of murder. The case does not come within s. 212
(a) because he means neither to kill nor cause bodily harm. Nor is the 
case within the wider terms of s. 212 (c) because death is not “likely”, 
that is, probable as opposed to possible.8 Nor is the case within the even 
wider terms of s. 213 because X has not committed any of the 
proscribed offences; nor does he have any of the qualifying intents.9
M submission is that X ought to be guilty of murder in the above 
illustration. He has foreseen a risk of killing yet callously decided to take 
it. My guess is that few people would strongly dissent from the view that 
this ought to be murder; and I do not think that any code which 
characterised this as murder could be said to be unduly draconic.
The trouble arises, it is said, when we apply this reasoning not only 
to the reckless terrorist but also to the reckless motorist. Take the case of 
Y. He has been drinking, as he well knows, more than he should when 
he has the responsibility of driving home in his car. He has promised to 
be home by 7 p.m. but it’s nearly that already so he decides he will have 
to cut a few corners in order to get home in time, in particular he will 
have to break a few speed limits. It occurs to Y that in his condition and 
driving at the excessive speeds in mind he may kill someone. It’s not a 
big risk, he says to himself, with luck I’ll get home all right. He doesn’t.
*“Likely”, according to the O.E.D., means “probably — in all probability”. This view o f “likely” in s. 212 
(c) is clearly supported by Mollrur (1948), 93 C.C.C. 36, at 44, per Casey J . ,  and appears to be supported 
by Anglin J., in Gravrs (1913), 21 C.C.C. 44, at 55 (S.C.C.). It may, however, be open to the Canadian 
courts to hold that "likely” means no more than foreseeable so that it would extend to the case where 
death is foreseen as possible.
•X might be liable to be convicted o f murder if he broke and entered in order to place the bomb and if 
the bomb can be regarded as a weapon.
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He is unable to stop when there is a pedestrian on the crossing ahead 
and the pedestrian is killed.
Ought Y to be convicted of murder? *iis case is indistinguishable 
from that of X unless we are prepared to say that there is some social 
utility in driving home in excess of the speed limit which is not present 
in planting bombs. The truth is that in neither case is there any social 
utility in creating the risk o f  death. Yet both law reformers and courts 
shrink from a definition of murder that might include the reckless 
motorist. This tenderness towards the reckless motorist was in evidence 
in the decision of the House of Lords in Smith,10 a decision not otherwise 
noted for its tenderness to anyone. That case purported to lay down an 
objective test as to foresight o f death but it was limited by requiring 
proof that
the accused was unlawfully and voluntarily doing something to someone. The 
unlawful and voluntary act must clearly be aimed at someone in order to 
eliminate cases o f negligence or o f careless or dangerous driving.11
While it is not transparently clear what the “aimed at” qualification 
requires,12 Lord Hailsham in Hyam thought that it would usually save the 
reckless motorist from conviction for murder.13
Why this tenderness for the reckless motorist? The answer is not 
hard to find. Most of us drive, many of us drink and it would be a 
harsh law that made us murderers if we killed. But it is not a conclusion 
from which I shrink. If  X and Y deliberately choose to put life at risk, 
does it make all that difference that X uses a bomb and Y uses a car? It 
does not, it may fairly be supposed, make all that much difference to the 
victim. I think it should be kept in mind that the motorist is much less at 
risk than the bomber. Motorists frequently cut corners but in so far as 
they advert to risk at all, it is to the risk of an accident or of being 
caught by the police. To be guilty of murder it would have to be proved 
that the motorist foresaw the risk o f death and deliberately and 
unreasonably chose to take it. Such cases will be very rare but where 
they do occur I see no good reason why the callous motorist should not 
run the risk of conviction for murder just as much as the callous 
terrorist.
"•[1961] A.C. 290.
" [1 9 6 1 ] A.C. 290, at 327.
'*See the discussion inSm ith & Hogan, Cnminal Law  (4th ed.), at 287.
I3[ 1975] A.C. 55, at 77. Lord Hailsham did not think it would always save the reckless motorist from 
conviction for murder.
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POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON TREATING RECKLESS KILLINGS 
AS MURDER
If  the view is taken that not all reckless killings should be treated as 
murder, various ways of limitation have been suggested. Recklessness as 
to death might be qualified by:
(a) Requiring that X foresees death as highly probable.
(b) Requiring that X foresees death as probable.
Support for both propositions (a) and (b) can be found in Hyam.14
(c) Requiring a qualifying intention to cause bodily harm (or serious bodily 
harm) with foresight o f  death as (i) highly probable; or (ii) probable; or 
(iii) possible.
S. 212 (a) o f the Canadian Criminal Code appears to adopt (c) (ii).
(d) Requiring the recklessness to manifest an extreme indifference to the 
value o f human life.
This last is the position adopted in s. 201.2 of the Model Penal Code of 
the American Law Institute.
If qualification (c) were to be adopted in any of its forms, it would 
extend neither to the bomber nor to the motorist in the illustrations given 
above. In both illustrations it was assumed that neither X nor Y 
intended harm to the person since both planned to avoid it. Accordingly 
both are entitled to an acquittal o f murder whether they have foreseen 
death as a mere possibility or a high probability.
If qualification (a) or (b) were to be adopted then the bomber and 
the motorist would be guilty o f murder if death is foreseen by them as a 
probability or high probability as the case might be. They would extend 
to neither if foresight were merely that death was “on the cards”. In this 
connection it is worth noting a recent decision of Lowry L.C.J. in 
McFeely.xh The case, almost a routine type in Northern Ireland, involved 
the planting o f a bomb at an inn. The usual warning was given as the
14[1975] A.C. 55. Note that if the Law Commission’s definition o f intention were to be applied to 
murder (it will not be because the definition is to apply only prospectively and not retrospectively) it 
would presumably include (a) but not (b). I f  X foresees a consequence as highly probable, he can hardly 
have any substantial doubt about its occurrence. I f  X foresees a consequence only as probable, there is 
room for a substantial doubt. O r is there? Perhaps it is a question o f what X thinks. He may have no 
substantial doubt though others, similarly placed, would have had a substantial doubt. Conversely, X 
may himself have a substantial doubt that an event will occur though others would think it a certainty to 
occur.
'*(1977), 24 November (unreported) Belfast City Commission. Note that trial is by judge alone in these
cases.
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terrorists decamped and the place was quickly cleared. The police were 
called and it was while they were making their investigations that the 
bomb exploded killing one o f the officers. McFeely was charged with 
murder and the case against him was that he had driven the bombers to 
a spot near the inn. While Lowry L.C.J. was satisfied that McFeely knew 
of the plan to plant the bomb, he was also satisfied that McFeely knew 
that the warning would be given. Experience of such events in Northern 
Ireland showed that while people were sometimes killed even when 
warnings were given, such cases were exceptional. Hence, following 
Hyam which required at least a foresight of a probability o f death, 
McFeely could not be convicted of murder. No doubt McFeely foresaw 
death as a possibility, but he did not foresee it as a probability.
In the course of his judgment the Lord Chief Justice asked (but 
prudently declined to answer) the question: what would the position 
have been if McFeely had driven the bombers to their destination in a 
series of attacks. The risk of death on any one attack is less than a 
probability, but the risk increases to a probability if a series o f attacks are 
involved. It is a nice question and I understand that many law teachers 
who were appraised o f the case used it in their criminal law examination 
papers last summer. I do not propose to answer the question but I do 
propose to utilise it to support the view that foresight of a risk o f death 
should suffice. It strikes me as the height of absurdity that a McFeely, 
armed with statistics showing the incidence o f deaths to bombings, could 
say: well, it won’t be murder if I transport the bombers on no more than 
five occasions but it will be if I transport them on six. Looked at from 
the point of view of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, 
it must seem like an unexpected bonus. They can ensure that their 
drivers and bombers are never at risk of a conviction for murder 
provided they are involved in no more than five attacks. My conclusion 
is, therefore, that foresight o f risk (i.e., a real risk and not something 
purely fanciful) ought to suffice.
What, then, is the position if qualification (d) is employed? In their 
comment on this proposal the American Law Institute is rather coy. The 
Institute says this:
Recklessness . . . presupposes the awareness of the creation o f substantial 
homicidal risk, a risk too great to be deemed justifiable by any valid purpose 
that the actor’s conduct serves. Since risk, however, is a matter o f degree and 
the motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation, some formula is 
needed to identify the case where recklessness should be assimilated to 
purpose or knowledge. The conception that the draft employs is that of 
extreme indifference to the value o f human life. The significance o f purpose 
or knowledge is that, cases o f provocation apart, it demonstrates precisely 
such indifference. Whether recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates 
similar indifference is not a question that, in our view, can be further 
clarified; it must be left directly to the trier o f the facts. If  recklessness exists 
but is not so extreme, the homicide is manslaughter . . . . '6
'*Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 9, at 29.
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It is said that this notion is easy to criticise. What might be said in favour 
of the notion is that i f  it is thought necessary to bring the reckless 
bomber within the definition of murder while leaving the reckless 
motorist without, then it rruiy be that this qualification provides a way of 
doing it. The trier of fact would have little difficulty in deciding that the 
bomber’s recklessness manifests extreme indifference to the value of 
human life, but might well pause before concluding that the motorist’s 
recklessness manifested such indifference.
It is impossible to say whether the American Law Institute had some 
such distinction in mind. It may be that the Institute had it in mind to 
trade this provision for a general abolition of the felony-murder rule in 
the various jurisdictions o f the United States. Hence s. 201.2 goes on to 
provide that such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the 
actor is engaged in certain violent crimes. This, it would seem was 
added as a sweetener to the revanchist interests wedded to the doctrine 
o f constructive murder. O f course when you read the small print17 
the presumption turns out to be rebuttable so what the Institute 
gives with the one hand it neatly abstracts with the other. Given 
agreement on the abolition of constructive murder this appendage to s. 
201.2 would be unnecessary in Canada. Nevertheless, i f  recklessness as to 
death is to be qualified at all, the “extreme indifference” notion may be the 
best o f the qualifications available.
CONSTRUCTIVE MURDER
Constructive malice has a lengthy, if uncertain, pedigree in the 
common law. In general terms it is a doctrine whereby a man is visited 
with liability for murder when he kills, however accidentally, while 
perpetrating some other offence. It was stated in its most extreme form 
by Lord Coke:
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A., meaning to steal a deer in the 
park o f B., shooteth at the deer and by the glance o f the arrow killeth a boy 
that is hidden in the bush, this is murder, for the act was unlawful, although 
A. had no intent to hurt the boy and knew not o f him. But if B., the owner of 
the park, had shot at his own deer, and without any ill intent had killed the 
boy by the glance o f his arrow, this had been homicide by misadventure and 
no felony. So if one shoot at any wild fowl upon a tree, and the arrow killeth 
any reasonable creature afar o ff without any evil intent in him, this is per 
infortunium, for it was not unlawful to shoot at the wild fowl; but if he had 
shot at a cock or hen, or any tame fowl of another man’s, and the arrow by 
mischance had killed a man, this had been murder, for the act was unlawful.18
Stephen questioned whether constructive malice was ever this extreme 
even in Coke’s time,19 but Hawkins could authoritatively assert that it
1 Vbtd., at 33.
" 3  Inst. 56.
'•Stephen, History o f the Criminal Law  (3rd. ed ), at 57.
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was murder to accidentally kill another while shooting at a fowl if the 
intention was to steal the fowl. Over the years, however, the doctrine was 
further whittled down until it extended only to (i) killing in the course 
of a felony involving violence (such as robbery, rape); and (ii) killing in 
the course o f resisting a lawful arrest by an officer of justice.
These forms of constructive malice were abolished in England in 
1957 following the recommendations in the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment. The Commission was clear that as a 
matter o f principle no man should be punished for consequences of his 
act which he neither intended nor foresaw. The Commission examined 
and rejected arguments that its abolition might lead to grave offenders 
being inadequately punished. In the end, the Lord Chief Justice of the 
day (Lord Goddard), who had at first pressed for the retention of the 
doctrine, came round to the view that the abolition of constructive 
malice would in no wise diminish the security of the public.
When the Code was promulgated in Canada in 1892 it did contain 
the constructive murder doctrine, but in a distinctly less draconic form 
than it then existed in England. But, and here is an odd paradox, while 
English judges sought to restrict their doctrine still further, the 
Canadian legislature moved in the opposite direction so that Canada 
now has in s. 213, a more draconic law than it had in 1892! The 
requirement in the original Code for grievous bodily harm has been 
whittled down to any bodily harm; the range of offences to which the 
doctrine is applicable has been extended; and entirely new provision has 
been made for death caused by the use or possession o f a weapon 
during the commission o f the scheduled offences. Apropos o f this last 
extension, Professor John Willis has shown20 that it passed through the 
Commons and the Senate without a line of public discussion in the 
Government’s haste to secure the passage of a number of Code 
amendments before the end o f the session. Professor Willis castigated 
the provision as “savage and incoherent” but, unmindful of his 
strictures, Parliament subsequently deleted the words “of its use” which 
had formerly appeared after “and death ensues as a consequence” — 
thus increasing, at a stroke o f the pen, both its savagery and its 
incoherence.
Concerning these forms o f constructive malice I can do no better 
than ally myself with their critics who have pressed for their abolition. 
They have not merely outlived their usefulness: they have never had any 
utility other than to satisfy a primitive instinct for vengeance which, as I 
trust, society has now outlived.
There is another form of constructive murder implicit in s. 212 (c). 
Under this provision a man may be guilty of murder if in the pursuit of 
an “unlawful object” he does anything which he “ought” to know is
**(1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 784, at 792.
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“likely” to cause death. It is now clear law that the sub-section imports 
an objective test in relation to the consequence of death so that the 
accused may be convicted of murder though he did not contemplate 
death. Yet Professor Hooper has cogently argued21 that it was never 
intended (certainly it was not Stephen’s intention) that this provision 
should be open to the “monstrous” interpretation that might extend 
murder to the extreme example given by Coke. Hooper pointed out that 
the words “ought to know” are “quite out of harmony with the rest of 
the section and with the avowed intention of Stephen and the 
Commissioners to restrict the ambit of the felony-murder rule.” The 
conclusion which Hooper reached, and it is one with which I respectfully 
agree, is that the villain of the piece is the presumption of intent. The 
provision meant to imply no more than that it may be inferred that a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence was in fact foreseen by the accused; 
but the provision was poorly shaped to make this plain and the 
inference more readily deduced is that a rebuttable inference o f fact has 
been replaced by an irrebuttable presumption of law.
There is no rule o f the adjectival law that has caused more trouble 
in the substantive law of crime than the so-called presumption that a 
man intends the natural consequences of his acts. It led the House of 
Lords into serious error in D.P.P. v. Smith22 and no decision of the 
House o f Lords has been more reviled than that one. To defend the 
philosophy of Smith or o f s. 212 (c) o f the Code (for they are two sides of 
the same counterfeit coin) would require not merely a brave man, but a 
foolhardy one. The dislike, be it noted, has not been confined to 
academics; trial judges (who are probably not as cavalier with their 
criticisms o f the House of Lords as academics) have quietly voted with 
their feet — they have just ignored it.23
MANSLAUGHTER
Thus far 1 have plumped for a definition of murder which restricts 
murder to cases where the accused intends to kill or knows that his 
conduct may kill. Turning to manslaughter I propose an altogether 
simpler solution which is to abolish it. A proposal arguably so bold calls 
for a word or two of explanation. Under the Code manslaughter takes 
three forms: killing by criminal negligence, killing by unlawful act, and 
killing under provocation.
11 Hooper, "Some Anomalies and Developments in the Law of Homicide", (1967) 3 U.B.C.L.R. 55, at 62. 
” [1961] A.C. 29<).
’ ’ Buxton, "T he Retreat from Smith”, [1966] Crtm L.R. 195.
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Killing by Criminal Negligence
Criminal negligence is defined in s. 202 (1) as “wanton or reckless 
disregard for the lives or safety” of others. The decisions of the courts 
of the meaning of “wanton or reckless” are not always, or even 
sometimes, models o f clarity,24 but, if I may state my conclusion without 
lengthy argument, it is that “wanton or reckless disregard” does not 
require (though it would be satisfied by) actual foresight o f danger by 
the accused. It does, though, require negligence of a very high order. It 
requires negligence such that a reasonable man, circumstanced as the 
accused, would instantly have recognised, not only a greater risk o f 
injury, but a risk o f great injury. The question here is whether it is 
permissible to punish a man for a failure — in this case a crass failure — 
to foresee what the reasonable man would have foreseen. I do not 
believe it is. From the utilitarian point o f view, on what basis is 
punishment assigned for the accused’s failure (even his gross failure) to 
foresee a risk which the most o f us would have recognised? The 
punishment can hardly deter the majority of us for, as reasonable men, 
we would have foreseen the risk and thus had the choice o f running it 
or avoiding it. Nor can it deter the minority who share the accused’s lack 
of perpicacity because ex facie  they would not have foreseen the risk 
either. Is it, then, that by punishing the accused we make sure that he 
does not make that mistake again? Possibly it will make sure that he does 
not make that particular mistake again, but it cannot ensure that he will 
not make other egregious errors o f judgment in different situations. 
And from the moral point o f view, I am unhappy about punishing a 
man who, because of physical or mental shortcomings, cannot recognise 
a risk that a normal man would have recognised.
If you remain unconvinced by the case for the abolition o f criminal 
liability for negligently caused death, there are two alternatives that 
might be worth consideration. One is to reformulate, as Professor Hart 
has suggested,25 the test of liability for negligence to take account of 
whether the accused, with his mental and physical capacities, ought to 
have foreseen the risk and could have taken measures to avoid it. The 
other (it is really an and/or) is canvassed by the English Criminal Law 
Revision Committee and is to create an offence less than homicide; their 
proposal being for an offence o f reckless killing punishable by 
imprisonment for fourteen years.26
,4See Mewett & Manning, Criminal Law  (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978), KM) et seq.
15Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961), at 29.
2*Working Paper on Offences against the Person, para. 91. The (I.L.R.C. believes this would cover "most" 
cases o f  manslaughter by gross negligence but for the new offence, there would have to be foresight o f 
"death or serious injury" —  thus the ('..L.R.C.’s proposal would extend to some killings that I would 
bring within the definition o f murder.
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Manslaughter by Unlawful Act
This is the doctrine of constructive manslaughter and historically is 
the junior partner of constructive murder. As the constructive murder 
doctrine was narrowed to become the felony-murder rule so constructive 
manslaughter grew to occupy the field vacated by the senior partner. In 
the United States it is commonly, and fairly accurately, referred to as the 
misdemeanour-manslaughter rule.
As may be guessed, I am in favour of dissolving the firm without 
compensation to either partner. It is significant that in mooting the 
abolition of constructive manslaughter in England, the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee mentions no arguments in favour of its retention. 
Quite right of course. There are none.
Killing Under Provocation
At first sight it seems clear that if murder is to be retained some 
form of reduced murder to encompass killings under provocation must 
be retained. But that, it seems to me, depends on the punishment for 
murder. Under the Code at present the punishment for murder is 
mandatory. Whether the conviction is for first or second degree murder 
the sentence must include imprisonment for life. But is it really 
necessary to have a mandatory life sentence on conviction for murder? 
In England the Criminal Law Revision Committee has expressed itself in 
favour of retaining the mandatory life sentence but the Law Reform 
Committee of New Zealand was in favour of abolishing the fixed 
sentence. I have to confess (a rare moment of weakness for me) that I 
have equivocated on this issue in the past but I am now of the view — I 
believe firmly — that the fixed penalty should be abolished and, as with 
practically all other crimes, the judge should fix an appropriate sentence 
having regard to all the circumstances.
Stephen (again in the passage quoted) reminded us that it is very 
difficult to produce a definition of murder that takes account o f the 
infinite variety of circumstances in which killings take place. This is, 
incidentally, true of the definition of all crimes, but whereas discretion in 
sentencing which is available for most crimes allows the judge to fit the 
punishment to the circumstances, the fixed penalty for murder denies 
him this sensible option. l ake the tragic case of Simpson, 27 for example. 
Returning home on leave from the trenches in France in the Spring of 
1915, William Simpson found his two year-old son suffering cruelly 
from hydrocephalus (water on the brain) and neglected by Mrs. Simpson 
who spent much of her time out drinking with her boy-friends. The
*7( l9 l .r>). Il Cr. App R ‘J1H (C.C.A.).
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situation proved too much for .Simpson and, unable any longer to 
tolerate his son’s sufferings which were quite agonising, he killed the boy 
to end his pain. Since there was nothing upon which Simpson could 
predicate a defence of provocation he was convicted of murder As the 
law stands in Canada28 a Simpson may be convicted of murder and must 
be sentenced to imprisonment for life. But surely in such a case the 
public interest would be served, as it could be served if the penalty for 
murder were not fixed, by the imposition of a much more humane 
sentence.
Given the abolition of the fixed sentence I see the following as 
among the advantages.
First, there is no need to provide in the substantive law for a 
defence of provocation as the Law Reform Committee of New Zealand 
points out. Where a killing is done under provocation the trial judge 
would need only to take account of this in sentencing.
Secondly, it becomes unnecessary to provide in the substantive law 
for a defence of diminished responsibility. In England, where 
diminished responsibility has been introduced, it is available only on 
charges of murder because on virtually all other charges the judge has a 
discretion as to sentence which in any case enables the judge to make 
appropriate allowance for cases where responsibility is diminished.
Thirdly, it becomes unnecessary to provide for so-called mercy 
killings — a matter which has caused the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee in England very considerable problems. Mercy killings are 
usually easy to recognise but difficult in the extreme to define 
satisfactorily. Legislative provision in the substantive law for cases such 
as William Simpson’s would be fraught with problems; the application in 
such cases o f common sense and common humanity would not.
Are there any disadvantages? It has been suggested to me that my 
proposals would put too much power in the hands of the judges. It 
seems to me, however, that my proposals would merely bring murder 
into line with most other crimes where the judge has a discretion as to 
sentence. The decisions of the judge are open to review and in turn the 
decisions of appellate tribunals may be re-examined. As I see it, the 
emphasis would shift from the substantive law of crime to the principles 
of sentencing and what will be needed, of course, is a sophisticated
'"In  England. Simpson might now qualify for a verdict o f manslaughter under the flexible doctrine o f 
diminished responsibility. CJ. Gray (unreported) The Times, 7 October 1965. Cirav's twelve vear old son 
was suffering from incurable cancer and could not even bear the weight of his own bedclothes. (>ra\ 
killed the boy while he slept. He was found guilty of manslaughter owing to diminished responsibility 
and was placed on probation for twelve months with a condition o f psychiatric care, the judge adding 
that no one could account his action as criminal. Although Canadian courts recognise something akin to 
diminished responsibility in some circumstances (see Mewett -Sc Manning, Criminal Law, at ‘J I 2  el seq.) it 
is thought unlikely that it could Ik - applied in cases such as these.
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jurisprudence of sentencing. I think the courts are equal to the task. It is 
the legislature’s function to spell out general rules for the governance of 
society: it is the judical function, within the legislative framework, to do 
justice in individual cases.
A POSTSCRIPT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
With the renewal o f the public controversy on capital punishment 
this may not be the most propitious of times to be advocating reform of 
the law of homicide. But I do not think that the proposals I have 
outlined in any way pre-empt the issue of capital punishment or the 
matter o f degrees o f homicide. It would be possible to single out certain 
murders (such as murders of police officers or murders during the 
course of specified offences) which may carry the death penalty or some 
other fixed penalty though only where the killing itself satisfied the new 
definition of murder.
I hope it will not be supposed, that I am advocating the return 
of the death penalty for any form of murder. All I am saying is 
that its reinstatement must be predicated, as a minimum requirement, 
on an intentional or reckless killing. It is unnecessary for me to rehearse 
the pros and cons of capital punishment (there is hardly a pro or con 
left which has not been extensively documented and exhaustively 
argued) but I cannot resist a word or two.
With those who would want to restore capital punishment I would 
like to raise two issues. One, which is apparently trivial and workaday, is: 
how do we set about recruiting an executioner? The question is not so 
absurd as may appear. In one o f the last cases in Canada (this was 1973) 
where there was a real possibility that a death sentence might have to be 
carried into effect, genuine difficulties arose concerning the availability 
o f a hangman. The provincial authorities took the view that it was a 
Federal responsibility to provide a hangman; for their part the Federal 
authorities said it was a provincial responsibility and the sheriff was 
bluntly told that if he could not find someone he would have to do the 
job himself. Inquiries were then made in England but a reprieve ended 
the search. How does a civilised community set about recruiting and 
training a hangman?
I'he other issue is this. While I have argued for a definition of 
murder based on intentionally or recklessly caused death and regard 
either as a necessary condition of liability, the degree to which a person is 
responsible involves a consideration of all the circumstances of the case 
and the offender. One does not have to be a moral philosopher to 
appreciate the difference between liability and responsibility, and to 
recognise the difference between a Cesare Borgia and a William 
Simpson. But I am not convinced that we know enough of human
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behaviour to say with complete conviction that a man is so completely 
and totally responsible for his actions that we may kill him for his 
shortcomings. It is probably the case that all o f us, partly through 
genetic factors and partly through social conditioning, are something less 
than free agents. The available evidence, imperfect though it is, suggests 
that people are more or less responsible, but I doubt whether a man can 
claim total responsibility for any act of his whether it is wholly good or 
wholly bad.
It is for this sort o f reason that the progress o f man in his treatment 
of his anti-social colleagues has been in the inexorable direction of 
humanity, understanding and compassion. Those who now stand for 
capital punishment, for harsher penal regimes, would no doubt have 
stood shoulder to shoulder with Lord Loughborough, the Lord High 
Chancellor o f England, when in 1790 he opposed the Bill to abolish the 
burning of women for counterfeiting and to substitute hanging therefor. 
“My Lords,” he said:
I see no great necessity for the alteration because, although the punishment 
as a spectacle, is rather attended with circumstances o f horror, it is more 
likely to make a lasting impression on the beholders than mere hanging; and. 
in fact, no greater degree o f personal pain is thus inflicted, the criminaí being 
always strangled before the flames are suffered to approach her body.29
There is, just possibly, a lesson to be learned from the history of crime 
and punishment. It is that the just society is best under-pinned by 
rationality, by understanding, by tolerance and compassion. Society is 
insecure when it is based on notions of self-righteousness, o f mistrust 
and o f revenge.
‘ •Campbell, Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors, Vol. 6, at 326. His Lordship also expressed the view that he had 
not "the smallest doubt" but that the public dissection o f the corpses o f  criminals "is attended with the 
most salutary consequences in repressing crime".
